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INTERSPOUSAL CONTRACTS
Introduction
The matrimonial regimes revision permits husbands and wives
to enter into enforceable agreements between themselves on an
almost unlimited scale. Civil Code article 1790' was amended to
delete the general interspousal incapacity.' Provisions which limited
interspousal sales3 and which banned reciprocal donations between
spouses in the same act 4 were repealed,' and Civil Code article 2329
was amended to allow spouses to enter into matrimonial agreements
during, as well as before, marriage. To allow enforcement of these
new agreements, the general procedural bar to interspousal suits
was also removed.'
Under the prior law, spouses generally could not contract with
each other, nor could they enter into matrimonial agreements after
1. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1790. Prior to January 1, 1980, article 1790 read:
Besides the general incapacity which persons of certain descriptions are under,
there are others applicable only to certain contracts, either in relation to the par-
ties, such as husband and wife, tutor and ward, whose contracts with each other
are forbidden; or in relation to the subject of the contract, such as purchases, by
the administrator, of any part of the estate which is committed to his charge, and
the incapacity of the wife, even with the assent of the husband, to alienate her
dotal property, or to become security for his debts. These take place only in the
cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this Code.
Even though the language of Civil Code article 1790 refers to special, rather than
general incapacities of persons, Louisiana courts interpreted the article as forbidding all
contracts between spouses except where specially authorized by law. See Ward v.
Ward, 339 So. 2d 839, 841 (La. 1976). See also Bilbe, "Management" of Community
Assets Under Act 627, 39 LA. L. REV. 409, 436 (1979); Pascal, Louisiana's 1978
Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53 TUL. L. REV. 105, 130 (1978); Riley, Analysis of
the 1980 Revision of the Matrimonial Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 453,
460 (1980).
2. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 1.
3. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2446 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 2).
4. See LA. CIV. CODE art, 1751 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 2).
5. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 2.
6. LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950 & Supp. 1979 & 1980). This new statute allows spouses to
sue each other for all causes of action arising out of their contracts, as well as for all
causes of action arising out of the new matrimonial regimes legislation. Although not
explicit in the language, the legislation clearly did not intend to take away any right a
spouse might have had under the old law to sue the other spouse. Id., comments (b) &
(c).
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marriage.7 An exception allowed spouses to make donations to one
another8 that were irrevocable' and that were not considered pro-
hibited matrimonial agreements." These donations could be used to
change the characi:er of marital property already acquired and com-
monly were used to make community property the separate prop-
erty of the donee spouse.
The comments to the new matrimonial regime articles indicate
that husbands and wives now will be able to engage in a wider
variety of contracts-to sell or lease property to each other, to
enter into compromise agreements, and to employ each other."
These articles pose new problems, and already some disagreement
exists as to which types of contracts are allowed.'" The object of this
note is to provide a method of analysis by which these potential in-
terspousal contracts can be examined.
Definition
Though the phrase "interspousal contracts" is not found in the
Louisiana Civil Code, it refers to that class of contracts between
spouses which cannot be considered "matrimonial agreements," the
latter being defined in Civil Code article 2328. This division of con-
tracts into two groups is not based upon the time of contract forma-
tion, since matrimonial agreements can be formed after as well as
before marriage.' However, couples may enter into binding
7. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2329 (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, § 1; 1980 La. Acts, No. 565, § 1). See note 2, supra.
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1746 states that, "One of the married couple may, either by
marriage contract or during the marriage, give to the other, in full property, all that
he or she might give to a stranger."
9. Although these donations were considered valid, the jurisprudence under Civil
Code article 1749 consistently had found that these donations are revocable by the
donor at any time. Mclrtyre v. Winnsboro State Bank & Trust Co., 213 La. 914, 35 So.
2d 852 (1948); Cousin v. Saint Tammany Bank & Trust Co., 146 La. 393, 83 So. 685
(1920). This situation was reversed by LA. R.S. 9:2351 in 1950, however, and since then,
donations between spouses have been irrevocable as a general rule, unless the dona-
tion was made by notarial act and revocation was expressly reserved.
10. See, e.g., Succession of Byrnes, 206 La. 1026, 20 So. 2d 301 (1945).
11. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329, comment (a):
Spouses are free to contract with each other during marriage as to all matters
that are not prohibited by public policy. For example, they may sell or lease prop-
erty to one another'; they may enter into a compromise agreement; they may even
employ each other.
12. See, e.g., Bartke, The Reform of the Community Property System of Loui-
siana, 54 TUL. L. REv. 294, 302-04 (1979); Pascal, supra note 2, at 130.
13. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2329.
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matrimonial agreements after marriage only with judicial approval. 4
Such approval is not required for "interspousal contracts."
Determining which contracts require judicial approval is an ex-
tremely important consideration for spouses who contract with one
another.'5 Even though a cautious lawyer will advise his client to ob-
tain judicial approval whenever any uncertainty exists as to
whether a contract is a matrimonial agreement, guidelines can be
drawn to aid in reaching this decision."6
Because interspousal contracts consist of all contracts which are
not matrimonial agreements, it is important to define matrimonial
agreements. Matrimonial agreements are defined as contracts
"establishing a regime of separation of property or modifying or ter-
minating the legal regime."'" A contract establishing a regime of
separation of property between spouses is one which excludes the
legal regime of community of acquets and gains.'8 And, more
generally, "[a] matrimonial regime is a system of principles and rules
governing the ownership and management of the property of mar-
ried persons."'9 Arguably, one rule does not make up a system. A
regime consists of a system, and a system contemplates a methodic
arrangement of rules. Since judicial approval is required for a
matrimonial agreement that alters a matrimonial regime,1° a con-
tract which does not modify the system arguably will not require
judicial approval.
The matrimonial regime governs the "ownership and manage-
ment" of the property of married persons.2' Since the provisions of
the regime or system will act prospectively to govern the property
14. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2329. The terms "marriage contract" and "matrimonial
agreement" are used interchangeably in the matrimonial regimes revisions, although
under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, a matrimonial agreement was merely a species
of marriage contract. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2328, comment (c).
15. See Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative
Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 88 (1979). for a
discussion of the judicial approval requirement.
16. Because of the lack of clear delineation of which contracts will require court
approval, it will be difficult for an attorney advising a client concerning this issue.
However, court approval should not in any fashion injure an otherwise valid in-
terspousal contract which in truth did not require the judicial imprimatur. Court ap-
proval will certainly be burdensome and perhaps costly, even though the legislature
has not yet adopted a proper procedure for obtaining this approval.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2328.
18. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2370.
19. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2325.
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329.
21. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2325.
1982]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
to be acquired by spouses in the future, matrimonial agreements
contemplate an ongoing regulation of property as it comes into ex-
istence. The rules of the regime will determine which spouse will
own and manage future property at the very moment it becomes
present property. When the property comes into existence, it will be
categorized as separate or community property." Furthermore, the
rules of the regime will determine how that property will be managed
(whether the spouses will enjoy equal, joint, or exclusive manage-
ment over the property in question).
The special character of matrimonial agreements which allows
the classification of property as it comes into existence distinguishes
matrimonial agreements from interspousal contracts. In contrast to
matrimonial agreements, interspousal contracts can be used by
spouses to change the classification of property once it has been
classified by means of the matrimonial regime. It is this future ef-
fect of matrimonial agreements which arguably should trigger the
special requirement of judicial approval for agreements which
modify or terminate the regime during marriage.23
If the foregoing analysis is used to determine whether a sale of
property between spouses requires judicial approval, the inquiry
should focus on whether a single sale of property will modify or ter-
minate the system of rules which govern the ownership and manage-
ment of property of married persons prospectively. The sale certainly
will change the ownership of the object of the sale from one spouse
to the other, and along with ownership passes control or manage-
ment over that thing which is the object of the sale." However, a
difference exists between modifying the ownership and management
of property and modifying a system of rules governing that owner-
ship and management. In the former instance, the system will re-
main unchanged. The matrimonial regime will still classify future
property in the same manner as it comes into existence. The sale of
22. If the spouses are under- the legal regime of acquets and gains, then their
property is classified as community and separate property through the operation of
Civil Code articles 2338-2341. See Note, Classification of Incorporeal Movables, 42 LA.
L. REV. 744 (1982).
23. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE article 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, §
1, which allows the spo-ases voluntarily to partition the community without court ap-
proval. This article allovs the spouses to convert all of their community property into
separate property without court approval. The only major difference between thispar-
tition and a matrimoni,l agreement entered into with court approval to establish a
separation of property regime is that the partition affects only the property owned by
the spouses at the time of the partition. The matrimonial agreement, unless it also con-
tained a partition agrectment, would not affect the property presently owned by the
spouses, but only the property they acquired after the effective date of the agreement.
24. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 477 & 2439.
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property between spouses, thus, should not require judicial ap-
proval.
Another illustration is that of a wife contracting to provide
housekeeping services to her husband. This contract of employment
between the husband and wife would not affect or modify the
system any more than would a sale of property between them. The
husband, under the legal regime, would pay for his wife's services
out of his separate or community property. Under the legal regime,
the money the wife receives for her services would become commu-
nity. 5 Even if the ownership and management of the money changed,
as would be true if the husband paid out of his separate property,
the system of rules governing ownership and management would re-
main unaffected.
An examination of the matrimonial regimes legislation reveals
little as to legislative intent regarding distinctions between
matrimonial agreements and interspousal contracts. However, the
purpose of the judicial approval requirement for matrimonial
agreements may provide some assistance. This safeguard probably
was intended to protect the interests of the less worldly spouse and
to prevent that spouse from entering into disadvantageous
agreements which he or she does not fully understand." Yet, at the
same time, the Civil Code has always allowed donations of property
between spouses.27 Nor is judicial approval required for the spouses
to agree to alienate community assets," to donate community prop-
erty," to alienate the movable assets of a community enterprise," or
voluntarily to partition the community." Under the new legislation,
these types of transactions-in contrast to matrimonial agree-
ments-have something in common which allow them to be
perfected without judicial approval. In every one of these cases,
spouses are dealing with previously acquired assets. These assets
are classified as community or separate property prior to the con-
currence by the spouse or the decision by a single spouse to alienate
the property. The spouses are able to know the extent of the asset
they are alienating, and the effect the transfer will have on their
property.
25. Any property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the
effort, skill, or industry of either spouse is classified as community property. LA. CiV.
CODE art. 2338. See note 24, supra.
26. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 15, at 88.
27. See note 9, supra.
28. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2347.
29. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2349.
30. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2350.
31. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
19821
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A matrimonial agreement is different, however. It acts to classify
property and to create civil effects at the precise moment the prop-
erty is acquired; it acts upon property to be acquired in the future
by the spouses. When spouses enter into matrimonial agreements,
they probably will have very little idea as to the effect of future ac-
quisitions on thEir personal patrimonies. It is this uncertainty, at
least in part, as to the future effect on the property of the spouses
which justifies the requirement for judicial approval of matrimonial
agreements."
Uncertainty, however, could not be the only factor involved,
since couples are free to enter into matrimonial agreements prior to
their marriage without the approval of the judiciary.3 The effects of
a premarital matrimonial agreement are fully as uncertain as those
of a post-marital agreement. Perhaps lack of perspective caused by
the closeness of the marital arrangement itself-combined with the
possible dominance of one of the spouses as well as the future ef-
fects of the agreement-creates a situation in which judicial protec-
tion of the interests of the spouses should be required.
The legislature clearly did not intend to subject all contracts
between spouses to the requirement of judicial approval. If it had,
stronger language than that found in Civil Code article 2329 certainly
would have beeri used. By eliminating the general incapacities to
contract between spouses, an intent to allow at least some in-
terspousal contracts is ascertainable, and an intent to limit the
judicial approval requirement to a small class of contracts also can
be found.' The requirement of judicial approval, if the hypothesized
legislative purpose behind that requirement is valid, 5 should be
restricted to only those agreements between spouses that affect the
classification of fiuture property. This approach is consistent with
the elimination of the general interspousal incapacities by the
legislature, and also is in keeping with the trend to eliminate un
necessary legislai-ive protections for the wife, who in modern times
is generally as well educated and sophisticated in the ways of the
business world as is the husband. The requirement of judicial ap-
proval found in Civil Code article 2329, therefore, should be strictly
construed and limited in application to only those contracts between
spouses which modify the system of rules governing the ownership
32. See note 23. supra. See also Spaht & Samuel, supra note 15, at 88.
33. "Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement before or during marriage
as to all matters that are not prohibited by public policy." LA. CiV. CODE art. 2329. The
special requirement ol judicial approval is triggered only by a post-marital matrimonial
agreement. Id.
34. See notes 1-6, supra, and accompanying text.
35. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 15, at 88.
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and management of marital property which has the future effect of
classifying marital property as it comes into existence.
Transmutation Agreements
"Transmutation" is a term used to describe arrangements be-
tween spouses which change the character of property from
separate to community or vice-versa." In a sense, any agreement
between spouses dealing with their marital property can have the
effect of changing the character of that property. For example, a
partnership agreement between spouses might cause the character
of some of the marital property to change." The term "transmuta-
tion agreement" here refers to those agreements which have the
change of the character of marital property, either from community
to separate or separate to community, as their principal motive.
Other community property jurisdictions allow transmutation as a
general rule, and there is little doubt that such agreements are
allowed in Louisiana.
Historically, interspousal transmutation agreements had three
major obstacles. Civil Code article 1790 contained a general prohibi-
tion against interspousal contracts. 9 This prohibition has now been
removed. Civil Code article 2446 had limited sales between spouses
to three specified instaices.'" This article has now been repealed."
Spouses had no procedural mechanism to enforce interspousal con-
tracts.'2 This also was changed by the new revisions.4 '3 The new revi-
sions also repealed article 1751," so that reciprocal donations be-
36. See W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
421 (1975).
37. Partnership agreements are discussed more fully in text at note 73. infra.
38. For example, "liln California, transmutation is dangerously easy. One spouse
may refer to his or her separate property as 'ours' a few times, and lo and behold, it
is." See W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 36, at 421.
39. See note 1, supra.
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2446 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, § 2).
41. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 5; 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 2.
42. LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950) (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 711, § 2). Under this old provision a married woman could only sue her spouse for
separation of property, restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal property, separa-
tion from bed and board, or a divorce.
43. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4 and 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 2, amended LA. R.S.
9:291 (1950) to allow spouses to sue each other for actions arising out 6f contract or the
provisions of Title VI, Book III of the Civil Code. The amendments did not affect the
direct action statute, LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950 & Supp. 1958 & 1962), nor was it intended
to take away any other possible suits between spouses that the prior provision allow-
ed. LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950 & Supp. 1978 & 1979), comments (b) & (c).
44. See 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 5; 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 2.
1982]
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tween spouses ini the same act are no longer specifically disallowed.
Thus, the provisions of the law which historically have prohibited
spouses from entering into transmutation agreements have all been
altered or repealed so that they no longer restrict the contractual
freedom of Louisiana spouses.
Donations, of course, have long been used as a means of chang-
ing the classification of property from community to separate. Dona-
tions between spouses have always been allowed under Civil Code
article 1746, which was not changed under the new revisions.5 Also,
article 1751, which had prohibited reciprocal donations between
spouses, was repealed. Civil Code article 2343 provides for the ef-
fect of a donation by a spouse of his undivided interest in a thingy
forming part of the community. Thus, Louisiana spouses have more
freedom to donate property to each other than they possessed
before.
Civil Code article 2343.1, which was added in 1981, provides for
the effects of a transfer of separate property of one spouse into com-
munity property by onerous or gratuitous transfer.'7 This article
manifests a legisilative intent that spouses should be free to enter into
agreements which effect a transfer of their separate property into
community property. The comments to this article state explicitly
that a spouse may convey to the other spouse a thing that forms
part of his separate property with the stipulation that the thing
shall become part of the community.' Thus, Civil Code article 2343.1
indicates that interspousal transmutation agreements will be allowed
under the new regime.
Civil Code article 2336 allows spouses during the existence of
the community property regime to partition the community in whole
or in part, without court approval.'9 When this partition is perfected,
the things that Each spouse acquires are separate property. Article
2336 is the only Code article which affirmatively authorizes an in-
terspousal contract other than a donation.
It is difficult to imagine that the legislature did not intend to
allow transmutation agreements by the revision of these provisions
45. See note 9, supra.
46. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 2.
47. Comment (a) to this article states that it was enacted to clarify the law. Prior
to the passage of tis article much uncertainty existed as to the civil effects of a
transfer of separate to community property.
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2343.1, comment (b), added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
49. This provision for partition without judicial approval was added by 1981 La.
Acts, No. 921. Prior -to this amendment, article 2336 provided only for a judicial parti-
tion prior to the end of the regime.
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limiting interspousal contracts. Agreements between spouses to sell,
donate, or exchange their separate or community property to each
other are the simplest types of enforceable agreements into which
spouses can enter. The comments to Civil Code article 2329 state
that spouses are free to sell or lease property to each other, to
enter into compromise agreements, or to employ each other." Such
transactions may result in a transmutation of property. After ex-
amining the textual provisions, the rejection of the prohibition
against interspousal contracts, and the policy of the legislature
behind the removal of these prohibitions, no other conclusion can be
reached but that interspousal transmutation agreements are now
allowable under the new matrimonial regimes revisions.
Transmutation agreements, by definition, act to change the
character of previously classified property from separate to com-
munity or from community to separate.' They do not affect proper-
ty yet to be acquired. Because they affect only present property,
they should be considered interspousal contracts which do not re-
quire judicial approval. This argument is further supported by the
recent revision of Civil Code article 2336 which allows spouses
voluntarily to partition the community property without court ap-
proval.2 This amendment specifically allows at least one situation in
which previously acquired property may be reclassified by the
spouses without court approval, and probably reflects a general
legislative policy that any transmutation agreement should be con-
sidered an interspousal contract which does not require judicial ap-
proval.
A discussion of the possible effects of transmutation agreements
can be accomplished through an examination of the codal provisions
of.the legal regime. Civil Code article 2343 regulates donations by a
spouse to his mate of his interest in the community. 3 This donation
simultaneously transforms both the donor and the donee's interest
in a thing forming part of the community into the separate property
of the donee spouse, unless the act of donation provides otherwise.
Civil Code article 2343 is not clear as to what constitutes "a thing."
"Thing" conceivably could include either individual identifiable
50. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329, comment (a).
51. See note 36, supra.
52. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
53. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, provides in
part:
The donation by a spouse to the other spouse of his undivided interest in a
thing forming part of the community transforms that interest into separate prop-
erty of the donee. Unless otherwise provided in the act of donation, an equal in-
terest of the donee is also transformed into separate property ....
19821
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items, a percentage interest in the community, or all of the donee
spouse's community interest. Article 2336 suggests that "thing" will
include all of these items." The article allows the spouse voluntarily
to partition the community, thus converting the entire mass into the
separate property of either spouse.
Another problem is raised by the provision that "[u~nless provided
in the act of donation, an equal interest of the donee is also changed
into separate property."55 Without this provision a spouse, through
his individual act of donation, could make only his interest in a
tangible thing that forms part of the community the separate prop-
erty of his spouse. The other half interest would remain part of the
community. This provision is helpful, therefore, in dealing with in-
dividual tangible items." A different problem is raised, however, if a
spouse wished to donate to his mate a 10 percent interest in the
community. By the operation of this article, it is unclear as to what
the donee spouse would be entitled. 7 Probably, the donee spouse
would receive a:s separate property 10 percent of the entire com-
munity. Because of this lack of clarity, spouses should be clear as to
their intentions at the time of the donation so as to leave no doubt
as to how the act is to be interpreted.
Under article 2343.1 a spouse may convey to the other spouse a
thing that forms part of the transferor's separate property, with a
stipulation that the thing shall become part of the community.58 In
essence the transferor conveys to the other spouse one-half of what
54. LA. CIv. CODi-, art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, states:
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community prop-
erty. Nevertheless, neither the community nor things of the community may be
judicially partitioned prior to the termination of the regime. During the existence
of the community property regime, the spouses may, without court approval,
voluntarily partition the community property in whole or in part. In such a case,
the things that iaach spouse acquires are separate property.
55. LA. Civ. CO: art. 2343, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
56. For example, the husband buys an expensive ring for his wife for Christmas
by spending community funds. This ring, but for the act of donation, normally would
be community property. When the husband donates the ring to his wife, the entire
ring becomes the wile's separate property.
57. When a spouse donates to his mate "a 10/a interest in the community," it is
unclear as to whether the donor spouse wishes to donate a 10 percent share of the en-
tire community or of his undivided one-half interest in the community property. See
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1. This ambiguity in
language will leave the courts free, in the event a conflict should arise, to speculate as
to the donor's true intentions. Since the donor did not specify that he wanted to
donate to the separate property of his spouse only his interest in ten percent of the
community, then a donation of 10 percent of the entire community should be pre-
sumed.
58. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343.1. as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 2.
(Vol. 42
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
he owns, and retains the other half interest of the things as a com-
munity interest under the legal regime of acquets and gains."' Arti-
cle 2343 provides only for donations of community property to the
donee spouse. 0 Civil Code article 2343.1, however, provides for both
onerous and gratuitous transfers of separate property. This article,
like article 2343, does not define "thing." "Thing" should be defined
in the same manner as in article 2343, thus allowing for a transfer of
all or any part of the separate property of the contracting spouse.
One other very important effect of articles 2336, 2343 and 2343.1
is the effect that the use of these articles will' have on the succes-
sion rights of the spouses and their heirs. These articles can be used
to reclassify property of the marriage from separate to community
or vice-versa. Thus, transmutation agreements can influence the effect
that the Civil Code succession articles will have on the property rights
of surviving spouses.6' These rights are dictated by the classification of
the deceased's property as either separate or community. By the
terms of article 916, the surviving spouse has a legal usufruct over
as much of the decedent's share in the community property as may
be inherited by the deceased's descendants, if the deceased has not
disposed of his share in the community by testament." Additionally,
the surviving spouse may receive by testament a usufruct over all
of the deceased's separate property without impinging on the
legitime of forced heirs."2
Since transmutation agreements are allowed, spouses will be
able to enter into contracts which will affect their respective rights
in regard to the succession of a predeceased spouse. If all of the
marital assets are community and one spouse dies intestate, then
the surviving spouse will receive as separate property his half of
the community in full ownership and a legal usufruct over the
deceased spouse's share of the community which may be inherited
by the descendants, if any exist.u If there are no descendants, then
the surviving spouse receives the deceased's share of the community
in full ownership. Spouses, on the other hand, may wish to use
transmutation agreements to convert all or part of the community
into the separate property of either spouse. If the spouse who dies
59. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343.1, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 2.
60. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2343. as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1.
61. LA. Civ. CODE art. 890, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1: LA. CIv.
CODE art. 916, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 911, § 1.
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 916, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 911, § 1.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 916, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 911, § 1. But see LA.
Civ. CODE art. 890, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1. Under the terms of arti-
cle 890, the legal usufruct is limited to that which may be inherited by the issue of the
marriage with the survivor, or by illegitimate children.
64. See text of Civil Code articles cited at note 61,.supra.
1982]
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first owns as separate property all of the marital property, and he
dies intestate, then the surviving spouse will receive nothing from
the succession except possibly the marital portion" and the family
home in usufruct." If there is a testament, however, and the deceased
spouse grants a u.sufruct over all of his separate property to the sur-
viving spouse, thft surviving spouse may hold a usufruct over all of
the marital property without impinging upon the legitime.'
Transmutationl agreements are not capable of being used to
defeat the inheritance rights of forced heirs, however. The most im-
portant characteristic of interspousal contracts, as has been stressed,
is that they act upon the property of spouses only after it has been
acquired and clas:ified under their matrimonial regime." A transfer
of property by interspousal contract will be treated exactly as a
transfer of property between a spouse and a third party has been
treated." All donLtions between spouses will be subject to reduction
to the extent that they may impinge upon the legitime. 0 All onerous
transactions by irterspousal contract, if they are truly onerous, will
not injure the rights of forced heirs."' Naturally, the availability of
interspousal contracts will increase the temptation and frequency of
simulated transactions which are onerous on their face, but
gratuitous in reality. The courts should carefully scrutinize
suspected cases of simulated contracts between spouses, as they
always have done with suspected cases of simulated transfers be-
tween people who are not married."2
Partnership Agreements
Prior to 1980, spouses in Louisiana, even if engaged in the same
profession, were. not allowed to enter into valid partnership
agreements. 3 The original comment (a) to proposed article 2329 in
65. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2432.
66. LA. CiV. CODE art. 916.1. The title of 1981 La. Acts, No. 911, states that it is
"AN ACT ... to repeal article 916.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code relative to the same sub-
ject matter [relating to the usufruct of a surviving spouse] . . ." However, the body of
the Act failed expressly to repeal this article. Whether the article survives the Act is
a question beyond the scope of this note.
67. See text of Civil Code articles cited at note 61, supra.
68. See text preceding footnote 32, supra.
69. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1502-1505.
70. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1502-1505.
71. By operation of Civil Code article 1526, the rules of reduction will apply to a
transaction if the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the charges or
services.
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 211 La. 468, 30 S. 2d 321 (1947).
73. See Bartke, supra note 12.
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the new matrimonial regimes revision expressed the intent that in-
terspousal partnership agreements between Louisiana spouses
would now be allowed. This reference to partnership agreements
was eliminated from the comments as enacted, however." Thus,
whether or not partnership agreements between spouses are allowed
under the new regime is questionable, especially due to-the flexibil-
ity that partners enjoy in the control and management of their part-
nership affairs. As a general rule, the Code's partnership provisions
supplement, rather than restrict, the contractual capabilities of
would-be partners. On the other hand, the articles dealing with
matrimonial regimes restrict as well as supplement the contractual
dealings of married persons. The major issues regarding in-
terspousal partnerships, like the ones previously addressed concern-
ing transmutation agreements, are whether such partnerships are
allowed, and, if so, whether they require judicial approval.
The only Code article that has a reference to partnerships in the
matrimonial regimes provisions is Civil Code article 2352, which pro-
vides: "A spouse who is a partner has the exclusive right to manage,
alienate, encumber, or lease the partnership interest."" This provi-
sion was drafted to prevent the spouse who is not a party to the
other spouse's partnership contract from affecting the legal relation-
ship of a partner-spouse and the other partners." Article 2352
makes a partnership interest a property interest exempt from the
normal rules of equal management. This article presents no obstacle
to interspousal partnership agreements.
Historically, spouses were incapable of contracting partnerships
because they were generally incapable of contracting. In addition to
this restriction, the prior rules of community management and con-
trol, which generally gave the husband most of the control over com-
munity affairs, were not consistent with the notion of interspousal
partnership contracts, especially when the partnership would have a
great deal of control over the property of the marriage." The new
regime as a general rule has given to both spouses an equal hand in
the control and management of the community affairs."' The main
74. Id. at 304 n.48. It is not apparent from Civil Code article 2329 why this
reference to partnerships was deleted.
75. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2352.
76. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2352, comment. See, Note, Management of Community
Assets: Incorporeal Movables, 42 LA. L. REV. 770 (1982).
77. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 627, § 6; 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1). See also Bartke, supra note 12.
78. See generally Note, Management of Community Assets: Incorporeal Movables,
42 LA. L. REv. 770 (1982).
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obstacles to interspousal partnership agreements have been re-
moved,"9 but the new regime articles now must be examined to see
if any new obstacles were created.
Civil Code article 2330 seemingly presents no limits as between
the spouses themselves; it simply allows third persons to rely on the
management provisions of the legal regime which allow one spouse
acting alone to dispose of certain community property.' It appears
that spouses are free conventionally to limit the rights of one or
both spouses to manage some community property as between
themselves, but such an agreement will have no effect on third par-
ties if the agreement conflicts with the express provisions of Civil
Code article 233.
A partnership between spouses may not be desirable if its effect
toward third persons is limited or defeated by the restrictions found
in article 2330. An examination of some of the different types of
partnerships into which a husband and wife might enter illustrates
how a partnership might be used to limit the rights of one spouse to
manage community property. For example, a husband and wife, for
investment purposes, may decide to contribute community property
to a partnership consisting of many people, in which the husband
and wife may be limited partners. The spouses will lose the right to
manage that part of the community which has been contributed to
the partnership.8' Clearly this type of transaction will be allowed
under the new matrimonial regimes articles; for it is in many ways
similar to any other investments made by spouses which have
always been allowed, such as the purchase of stock.
It is only a small step to go from this type of arrangement to a
situation where both spouses are general partners in a partnership
consisting of many people. As general partners both spouses will
have a certain amount of managerial responsibilities over partner-
ship affairs and assets. If the spouses contributed money as well as
managerial functions, both spouses will share in the control over
their community assets contributed to the partnership as dictated
by their individual partnership agreements. This control will be
shared more or less equally with all of the general partners. This ar-
rangement should be allowed, since with regard to third persons, it
is quite similar to a situation in which both spouses are limited part-
ners. The only difference is that as general partners the spouses
have some control over the management of their assets contributed
to the partnership, while as limited partners, they could exercise no
79. See notes 3-44, supra.
80. LA. CiV. CoDE art. 2330.
81. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2840.
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such control. Third persons would not be forced to deal differently
with the partnership or the spouse.
The situation may take on a different character when a partner-
ship consists of only the husband and wife. If both spouses are
general partners and have agreed to share equally in the control
and management of partnership affairs, then the matrimonial
regimes articles present no obstacle to the partnership. Civil Code
article 2814 makes a partner a mandatary of the partnership for all
affairs in the ordinary course of its business other than for the
alienation, lease, or encumbrance of its immovables. 2 This provision
is not in conflict with the rules of the legal regime because the con-
currence of both spouses is required for the alienation, encum-
brance, or lease of community immovables. 3 The spouses have not
attempted to violate the mandate of Civil Code article 2330.
The result may be different, however, if the spouses enter into a
partnership agreement in which, for example, the husband is the
only general partner and the wife is a limited partner. In order for
the wife to retain her limited partner status, she cannot exercise
any managerial' powers over partnership affairs. If the assets of the
partnership, both movable and immovable, were community property
by the operation of the matrimonial regime between the spouses,
then a problem arises. By the partnership agreement, the wife can-
not concur in the alienation, control, and management of the part-
nership. Under Civil Code article 2330, the spouses cannot limit with
respect to third persons the right each one has to obligate the com-
munity or to alienate, encumber, or lease community property.8 '
Such a partnership arrangement between the spouses will not be ef-
fective as to third parties."
The fact that the reference to interspousal partnership
agreements was deleted from the comments to Civil Code article
2329 does not by itself create a strong presumption that the
legislature intended to disallow interspousal partnerships." By
eliminating certain previous obstacles to interspousal partnerships
and by failing to create any' new ascertainable restrictions, the
legislature arguably intended to permit at least some partnership
agreements between husbands and wives.
The final and perhaps most important question in this area is
whether interspousal partnerships will modify or terminate a
82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2814.
83. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2347.
84. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2330.
85. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2330.
86. See note 48, supra.
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matrimonial regime and thus require judicial approval for validity.
Since the purpose behind this requirement is served only when
agreements affect: future property, the question becomes whether a
partnership will have this future effect.
Partnership agreements are very flexible tools, and the parties
to such agreements possess the freedom to shape the partnership into
many forms to suit their own needs. A partnership can be used by
spouses to participate jointly in a business venture, or even as a
matrimonial regime to control the marital property. The purpose for
which the interspousal partnership agreement was entered should
be a major facto:, in deciding whether judicial approval will be re-
quired. Whenever the partnership agreement has a business pur-
pose and is not used to classify marital property, it will not have the
sort of future effect on the property of the marriage which would
render judicial approval necessary. The partnership property which
later becomes marital property will still be classified by the spouses'
matrimonial regime. Whenever a partnership is entered into be-
tween spouses with the intent to control, manage, and classify
marital property, judicial approval will be required since the con-
tract is actually a matrimonial agreement.
A problem arises, however, when the spouses enter into a part-
nership agreement with a "business purpose" and the property of
the business becomes mixed with the property of the marriage. The
obvious question is whether the possibility of intermingling of assets
presents an obstacle to spouses who wish to become partners. The
Civil Code provides little help in solving this problem. Article 2340
does create a presumption that all property in the possession of
spouses during the existence of the community is community prop-
erty.87 This preumption cannot be defeated unless one or both
spouses prove that the property is of a different nature.8 The argu-
ment that an interspousal partnership agreement should not be
allowed due to the possibility that the property of tlie partnership
might become mixed with the marital property is unconvincing. This
same argument, 'if valid, could be used as to a partnership between a
spouse and third parties when the partnership property becomes in-
termingled with the personal property of the partner spouse. Inter-
mingling of assets, therefore, should present no obstacle to in-
terspousal partnership contracts.
Partnerships between spouses, therefore, should be allowed
under the new matrimonial regimes revision. Judicial approval will
87. LA. CiV. COD. art. 2340.
88. LA. CIv. CoDE art. 2340.
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be required only when spouses attempt to use the rules of a "part-
nership" agreement as the rules of their matrimonial regime.
Conclusion
The arguments put forth in. this paper have been based almost
entirely on the text of the new matrominal regime articles and the
legislative purpose behind their enactment. The Louisiana courts at
the time of this writing have not yet had the opportunity to ex-
amine the validity of such interspousal agreements. Apparently
spouses now will be allowed to contract with each other in much the
same fashion as they always could contract with third parties. This
new contractual freedom will allow spouses to participate in new
and imaginative forms of estate planning which heretofore were not
available due to the incapacity of the spouses. Louisiana finally has
recognized the need for the contractual freedom of husbands and
wives.
Noel Joseph Darce
